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The Intersection of Judicial Attitudes and Litigant 
Selection Theories: Explaining U.S. Supreme Court 
Decision-Making 
Jeff Yates∗ 
Elizabeth Coggins∗∗ 
Two prominent theories of legal decision-making provide 
seemingly contradictory explanations for judicial outcomes. In 
political science, the Attitudinal Model suggests that judicial 
outcomes are driven by judges’ sincere policy preferences—judges 
bring their ideological inclinations to the decision-making process, 
and their case outcome choices largely reflect these policy 
preferences. In contrast, in the law and economics literature, Priest 
and Klein’s well-known Selection Hypothesis posits that court 
outcomes are largely driven by the litigants’ strategic choices in the 
selection of cases for formal dispute or adjudication—forward-
thinking litigants settle cases where potential judicial outcomes are 
readily discernable (e.g., where judicial attitudes are known), 
nullifying the impact of judges’ ideological preferences on case 
outcomes. We believe that the strategic case-sorting process proposed 
in the law and economics literature does, in fact, affect the influence 
of ideologies or attitudes on judicial outcomes. However, these two 
perspectives can be effectively wed to provide an integrated model of 
judicial decision-making that accounts for the influences of both the 
strategic behavior of litigants and the attitudinal preferences of 
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judges. We test this integrated model of decision-making on case 
outcomes in the United States Supreme Court and employ an 
interactive specification to assess the influence of judicial ideology 
on Supreme Court outcomes, simultaneously accounting for litigants’ 
and justices’ case selection (sorting) behavior. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Few scholars of the U.S. Supreme Court seriously doubt that the 
personal ideological proclivities of Justices play a role in the case 
decisions that they make. Indeed, the Attitudinal Model of judicial 
decision-making has enjoyed considerable success and respect in the 
fields of political science and law, and its application has been 
extended beyond the U.S. Supreme Court to other levels of the 
judiciary. The premise that a government actor’s personal policy 
preferences shape his or her decisions on important governance 
decisions is not singular to the courts. Indeed, ideological preferences 
have been advanced as a driving force in the decision-making of 
other institutional actors such as members of Congress and 
executives. However, the Attitudinal Model has perhaps been most 
fruitfully applied to decision-making on the U.S. Supreme Court, 
where scholars have argued that the Court’s institutional structure is 
particularly well-suited for Justices’ ideological preferences to play a 
critical role. Lack of oversight or higher professional aspirations, 
lifetime appointments, and a highly discretionary docket all work to 
facilitate the translation of Justices’ policy preferences into binding 
case opinions.1  
Emanating from the criticisms of the classic legal model of the 
1920s, the behavioral school of political science of the 1950s 
developed a model of decision-making that shifted the conventional 
assumptions about the High Court. Challenging the notion that 
Supreme Court decisions hinge solely on precedent, plain meaning of 
the Constitution, and the original intent of the Framers, Attitudinal 
theorists instead look to the ideological leanings of the members of 
the Court themselves to explain case and vote outcomes. Simply put, 
 
 1. See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED 92–96 (2002). 
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the Attitudinal Model posits that “[J]ustices base their decisions on 
the merits on the facts of the case juxtaposed against their personal 
policy preferences.”2 That is, Attitudinal adherents recognize that, 
while precedent and original intent may inform the Justices, these 
factors do not fully explain the decisions of the Court—it is the 
Justices’ ideological inclinations that essentially drive decision-
making.3  
Missing from most Attitudinal Model accounts of Supreme Court 
decision-making, however, is an accounting of the role of the case 
selection choices of litigants in the Court’s litigation process—an 
important consideration in assessing any type of court outcomes, 
according to scholars advocating the Litigant Selection Model. Thus, 
under this theoretical approach, the Attitudinal Model mistakenly 
ignores the fact that courts are essentially reactive institutions. That 
is, courts do not formally initiate policy-making. Instead, they rely on 
litigants to bring issues before them for legal resolution. As Frank 
Cross points out, “[t]hose cases that reach a judicial decision are the 
cases that the parties have chosen not to settle and thus represent a 
subset of disputes chosen by the parties, not by the judges.”4  
In their seminal 1984 article promoting the “Selection 
Hypothesis” model, law and economics scholars George Priest and 
Benjamin Klein suggest that this fact has important implications for 
the inferences that we draw from examining cases that are actually 
litigated (rather than settled). They explain that 
[T]he most important assumption of the model is that potential 
litigants form rational estimates of the likely decision, whether 
it is based on applicable legal precedent or judicial or jury bias. 
From this proposition, the model shows that the disputes 
selected for litigation (as opposed to settlement) will constitute 
neither a random nor a representative sample of the set of all 
disputes.5 
 
 2. Id. at 312. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Frank B. Cross, Decisionmaking in the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals, 91 CAL. L. 
REV. 1457, 1491 (2003).  
 5. George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984). 
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Priest and Klein go on to argue that this selection or sorting of 
disputes by utility maximizing parties creates a strong tendency 
toward a rate of litigation success for a given set of plaintiffs at trial 
or appellants at appeal of 50% regardless of the relevant legal 
standard or “whether judges or juries are hostile or sympathetic.”6 In 
other words, parties sort out and settle disputes in which potential 
outcomes are clear and the parties’ expectations converge, and the 
remaining “uncertain” cases that go forward to adjudication result in 
outcomes that approximate the flip of a fair coin, or 50-50.7  
With regard to Supreme Court outcomes, even though the Justices 
choose the cases that they hear from a large pool of petitions, litigants 
must ultimately choose to appeal their cases for the Court to have the 
opportunity to select them. Under a Selection Theory approach, this 
phenomenon plays an important role in the decision-making process 
of the High Court because it frames the nature and quality of the 
cases heard by the Court. This point serves as the basic premise of the 
Litigant Selection Model—the litigants have likely considered the 
attitudes and ideological inclinations of the Justices in their decision 
to appeal (or not appeal) their cases to the Court. Given that litigants 
and their attorneys are undoubtedly aware of the well-known 
ideological proclivities of the Justices, they likely sort out or settle 
cases that have relatively clear or predictable outcomes and, hence, 
the Court does not hear them. In this regard, the cases that are 
appealed to the Court are those that are not readily classified as 
winners or losers by the litigants and their attorneys. Thus, the direct 
influence of judicial ideology on the outcomes of these remaining 
“uncertain” cases is likely inconsequential since litigants have 
predetermined that such potential ideological biases are not at play. 
In the words of Priest and Klein, “the parties will act themselves to 
neutralize judicial bias.”8  
Of course, a number of factors can make cases difficult for 
litigants to classify in this manner. First, many cases hinge on issues 
that are not subject to an obvious left-right ideological quality or 
dimension. Second, some cases turn on legal questions that are 
 
 6. Id. at 5.  
 7. Id. at 36. 
 8. Id. at 37. 
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largely indeterminate—for instance, they may concern novel legal 
issues or be plagued by factual complexity or ambiguity. As we 
might reasonably anticipate, these cases do not lend themselves to 
ready prediction on the basis of judicial attitudes or ideologies (or 
legal standards, for that matter), unlike those cases in which judicial 
preferences are easily discerned and outcomes more predictable. 
Thus, the cases that are close or uncertain, or in which the parties 
have widely divergent expectations as to potential outcomes, are not 
settled and end up going to trial and appeal. 
Of course, the seemingly complex dynamics described above are 
essentially not too different from the calculated litigation reasoning 
process that seasoned trial lawyers have come to develop through 
handling many disputes and cases over the years. For example, in the 
criminal plea bargaining context, cases with clear-cut outcomes often 
have associated “going rates,” or shared views of how judges might 
decide the appropriate sentence for a given offense.9 Similarly, in 
civil cases, lawyers and their clients carefully size up their cases and 
attendant circumstances (e.g., judge or jury ideology) and settle those 
where the parties’ outcome expectations are clear and convergent and 
take to trial those that are not. Once in court, experienced litigators 
might tell you, the outcomes of these latter, indeterminate cases are 
often a toss up. Indeed, a trial lawyer’s financial success may turn on 
the old axiom of knowing “when to hold them and when to fold 
them” in sorting out cases for settlement or adjudication. 
The two theories of legal decision-making outlined above present 
us with what might be reasonably considered competing explanations 
of legal outcomes. Each theory is very well known and highly 
influential. It seems unusual that these two paradigmatic yet 
ostensibly contradictory accounts of legal decision-making would not 
yield a river of scholarship attempting to resolve or reconcile such an 
important theoretical conflict. Perhaps this state of affairs may be 
partly attributable to generalized interdisciplinary disengagement or 
unawareness. In this vein, Lawrence Baum suggests that integration 
of varying approaches to explaining Supreme Court decision-making 
is needed, although he concedes that “[t]he assumption that [J]ustices 
 
 9. GEORGE F. COLE & CHRISTOPHER E. SMITH, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 224 
(2008). 
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act solely on the basis of their policy goals has advanced our 
understanding of the Court a good deal.”10 Barry Friedman seems to 
agree with the former point, noting that “now might be the time for 
interdisciplinary collaboration between legal scholars and positive 
political scientists. Decades of differing approaches have left a 
lingering antagonism between the projects.”11 Perhaps because they 
have long been considered at odds with each other, these two theories 
have seen little academic interplay.12 To some degree, this may be 
attributable to the fact that the two theories emanate from different 
academic fields. Litigant Selection Model theories are commonly 
forwarded by law and economics scholars, while the Attitudinal 
Model is usually posited by scholars of political science. But, as 
Friedman reminds us, there is much to learn from well-executed 
combinations of two academic fields.13 Indeed, many scholars have 
lamented the lack of interplay between the legal and political science 
domains. Lee Epstein and Gary King echo these sentiments, claiming 
that scholars should take into account the lessons to be learned from 
past studies.14 In particular, they warn that “[f]ailure to do so is more 
than wasteful; it also decreases the odds that the ‘new’ research will 
be as successful as the original because the researcher is, in effect, 
ignoring the collective wisdom gained from the first piece.”15 Perhaps 
the best explanation for this particular theoretical disconnect in the 
literature is that law and economics approaches have focused 
primarily on the effect of litigant selecting, or sorting, strategies in 
trial courts while the Attitudinal Model is most often employed to 
explain variation in Supreme Court decisions or Justices’ voting 
choices. However, it is evident that our understanding of both trial 
 
 10. Lawrence Baum, What Judges Want: Judges’ Goals and Judicial Behavior, 47 POL. 
RES. Q. 749, 761 (1994). 
 11. Barry Friedman, Taking Law Seriously, 4 PERSP. ON POL. 261, 272 (2006). 
 12. But cf. Cross, supra note 4 (comparing legal, political, strategic, and litigant-driven 
models of circuit court judge decision-making); John M. de Figueiredo, Strategic Plaintiffs and 
Ideological Judges in Telecommunications Litigation, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 501 (2005) 
(examining the effect of judicial ideology on the selection and outcome of telecommunications 
regulatory cases). 
 13. See Friedman, supra note 11. 
 14. Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 58 (2002). 
 15. Id. 
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and appellate court decision-making would be enhanced through the 
incorporation of each of these important theoretical approaches.  
From this point, our study of the intersection of the Litigant 
Selection and Attitudinal Models of judicial decision-making unfolds 
as follows: In the next section we discuss in greater detail the 
Attitudinal Model, including its background, development, and 
current status. We then do the same for the Litigant Selection Model. 
In the section that follows, we outline how Attitudinal Theory and 
Selection Theory may be effectively wed to produce an integrated 
explanation for Supreme Court decisions which simultaneously 
accounts for litigants’ (and Justices’) strategic case sorting and the 
influence of judicial attitudes or ideology. We then develop and test 
our integrated theory of how attitudes and case selection interact in 
legal decision-making. Finally, we conclude by reflecting on the 
utility of applying such an integrated approach to explaining Supreme 
Court decision-making and address how future research might 
incorporate such approaches. 
II. COMPETING MODELS 
A. The Attitudinal Model 
The Attitudinal Model emerged during a period dominated by 
legal realism. Judicial decision-making, according to classical legal 
scholars, was guided solely by a “system of logically consistent 
principles, concepts and rules.”16 Personal preferences and ideologies 
were simply not considered to be an important component of 
decision-making. Indeed, “judging was more like finding than 
making, a matter of necessity rather than choice.”17 By the 1920s, 
however, scholars had begun to question the validity of this 
assumption. By the 1940s, political science had moved toward 
behavioralism, which endeavored to make political science a 
discipline of prediction and explanation. In 1948, Herman Pritchett 
authored The Roosevelt Court, a book that was among the first of its 
 
 16. Yosal Rogat, Legal Realism, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 420 (Paul 
Edwards ed., 1972). 
 17. Id. 
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kind in its systematic evaluation of court decisions.18 Pritchett 
centered his study on questions like, “If judges were merely 
‘declaring’ the law rather than making it, why did they so often 
disagree?”19 However, perhaps the first working definition of a model 
that considered the preferences of judges was offered by Glendon 
Schubert,20 commonly considered the father of the Attitudinal Model. 
One of Schubert’s primary contributions is his use of “ideal points,” 
or the positions of justices on an ideological continuum determined 
by their judicial beliefs.21 In Supreme Court Decision Making, David 
Rohde and Harold Spaeth greatly advanced the Attitudinal Model, 
giving meticulous definitions to otherwise fairly ambiguous terms. In 
particular, they define an “attitude” as:  
a (1) relatively enduring, (2) organization of interrelated 
beliefs that describe, evaluate, and advocate action with respect 
to an object or situation, (3) with each belief having cognitive, 
affective, and behavioral components. (4) Each one of these 
beliefs is a predisposition that, when suitably activated, results 
in some preferential response for the attitude object or 
situation, or toward the maintenance or preservation of the 
attitude itself. (5) Since an attitude object must always be 
encountered within some situation about which we also have 
an attitude, a minimum condition for social behavior is the 
activation of at least two interacting attitudes, one concerning 
the attitude object and the other concerning the situation.22 
At its core, the argument is that these attitudes of the Justices 
“should cause a behaviorally predisposed [J]ustice to support certain 
legal claims and to oppose others.”23 There are structural 
characteristics of the Supreme Court that make it particularly well 
 
 18. HERMAN C. PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT (1948). 
 19. WALTER F. MURPHY ET AL., COURTS, JUDGES AND POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 18 (6th ed. 2006). 
 20. See generally GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND 
IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: 1946–1963 (1965).  
 21. See generally id. 
 22. DAVID W. ROHDE & HAROLD J. SPAETH, SUPREME COURT DECISION MAKING 75 
(1976) internal citation omitted). 
 23. JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE 
ATTITUDINAL MODEL 69 (1993). 
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suited to Justices’ attitudinal decision-making and merit at least brief 
mention. First, the Supreme Court Justices control their own docket, 
and while such control does not necessarily dictate that the Justices 
will vote according to their own policy preferences, it does provide 
them with considerable discretion to hear only cases they deem 
important and worth adjudicating. Additionally, Supreme Court 
Justices are not electorally accountable.24 That is, they do not face 
reelection concerns and, hence, are not held accountable to the 
electorate for their actions on the bench. Justices are also generally 
considered to be immune to political ambition.25 Although judges at 
other levels may desire a higher judicial post, no such opportunity 
exists for Supreme Court Justices. Lastly, the decisions made by 
Supreme Court Justices cannot be overturned by a higher court—it is 
the pinnacle of both the federal and state judicial systems and does 
not consider overhead monitoring concerns from other judicial 
actors.26 For all of these reasons, Justices are largely free to apply 
their policy preferences, just as the Attitudinal Model predicts.  
The intuitive logic of the Attitudinal Model does not necessarily 
translate easily into sensible concept operationalization or hypothesis 
testing. Indeed, the impalpable nature of personal attitudes and 
ideology makes this a difficult task. Because the Attitudinal Model 
claims that Justices base their decisions “on the facts of the case 
juxtaposed against their personal policy preferences,”27 the personal 
attitudes or ideologies of Justices must be estimated and measured in 
order to test the Model. However, techniques for estimating the 
preferences of political actors commonly suffer from circularity 
issues. Consider, as an example, the Congressman who is deemed to 
be ideologically liberal because his voting record lines up on the 
liberal end of the ideological spectrum. His personal ideology or set 
of attitudes is categorized as liberal because his votes have been 
liberal. However, his policy choice on a given vote could emanate 
 
 24. Jeffrey A. Segal, Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Theory of Congress and 
Courts, 91 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 28, 29 (1997). 
 25. Id.  
 26. However, arguments have been made that Justices consider the potential reactions of 
other branches and the public to their decisions. See, e.g., LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE 
CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 12–17 (1998). 
 27. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 312.  
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from influences other than his personal ideological preferences (e.g., 
the ideology of his constituents or strategic voting behavior)—there 
exists no independent verification of his personal policy preferences 
outside of his voting record. 
In hopes of correcting this circularity problem, Jeffrey Segal and 
Albert Cover endeavored to develop ideological scores for Supreme 
Court Justices that were independent of Justices’ prior judicial 
decision-making.28 They employed content analysis of post-
nomination, pre-confirmation op-ed stories from the nation’s leading 
newspapers29 to assemble exogenous accounts of Justices’ ideological 
inclinations at about the time they ascended the High Court. This 
method, they claim, provides comparable information on each 
Justice.30 The editorials were coded paragraph-by-paragraph for 
assertions concerning the Justice’s perceived ideology.31 Using the 
perceptions of newspaper writers as to Justices’ attitudes to 
approximate their actual attitudes is an imperfect method for 
operationalizing Justices’ ideologies, but acquiring this information 
from the Justices themselves through surveys or interviews is 
unfortunately not a viable option32 and might be fraught with other 
concerns even if it were possible.  
 
 28. Jeffrey A. Segal & Albert D. Cover, Ideological Values and the Votes of the U.S. 
Supreme Court Justices, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 557, 557 (1989). According to Segal and 
Cover, “one cannot demonstrate that attitudes affect votes when the attitudes are 
operationalized from those same votes.” Id. at 558. See ROHDE & SPAETH, supra note 22, and 
SCHUBERT, supra note 20, for studies that describe attitudes of the judges based on votes cast 
by those judges. Of course, studies on judicial behavior have long used judges’ partisanship or, 
when relevant, the party of the judges’ appointing President to provide insight as to judges’ 
ideological preferences. A particularly noteworthy study considered personal and professional 
background variables of Supreme Court Justices to help explain their voting behavior. See 
generally C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme 
Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics Decisions, 1946–1978, 75 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 355 (1981). 
 29. The authors selected four newspapers, two more liberal and two more conservative. 
On the liberal side, the New York Times and the Washington Post were used. On the 
conservative side, the Chicago Tribune and the Los Angeles Times were used. Segal & Cover, 
supra note 28, at 559. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Segal and Cover do not include editorials written post-confirmation because they 
would “undoubtedly be influenced by votes a [J]ustice casts and thus not independent of those 
votes.” Id. 
 32. Id. at 560. 
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Segal and Cover use their scores to explain Justices’ lifetime 
voting records (percentage of liberal votes) in civil liberties cases 
from the 1953 to 1987 Terms.33 They find a .80 correlation between 
Justices’ ideology scores and their voting behavior.34 The results 
were remarkably robust and not dependent on the scores of any 
particular Justice.35 In later work, Segal and Spaeth assess the 
usefulness of the scores in explaining the votes of an expanded set of 
Supreme Court Justices on civil liberties cases.36 They find that the 
scores explain the Justices’ voting quite well in a bivariate regression 
model with an adjusted R2 of .55. They conclude that “the results 
supply exceptional support for the attitudinal model.”37 Compared to 
other models used to explain court decisions, Segal and Spaeth argue, 
the Attitudinal Model is the only one that “has been successfully used 
to predict the Court’s decisions [giving it] its status as the best 
explanation of the Court’s decisions.”38  
Of course, one weakness in the Segal-Cover scores is that they do 
not allow for potential Justice variance or “drift” in ideology over 
time. In other words, the ideology scores are time-invariant and do 
not allow for the fact that Justices’ ideological outlooks or contextual 
changes in their work environment might lead them to approach cases 
differently over time. In recent work, Andrew Martin and Kevin 
Quinn have used a Bayesian modeling strategy to develop term-by-
term ideal point scores for Justices based on their case voting; this 
allows them to provide evolving estimates of Justices’ ideological 
preferences over time as well as more nuanced estimates as to the 
ideologically median Justice for a given Term.39 
 
 33. Id. at 561. 
 34. Id. 
 35. In a follow-up study, Segal and his associates update the scores and analysis to the 
1992 Term and backdate it to the 1946 Term. Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the 
Votes of U.S. Supreme Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812, 815 (1995). They also extended 
their analysis to include economic cases. Id. at 813. They found that the scores remained a good 
explanation for judicial voting in this extended timeframe, but that correlations were higher for 
civil liberties cases (.69) than for economic cases (.56). Id. at 817 tbl.3.  
 36. Segal and Spaeth note that they examine civil liberties cases because the newspaper 
op-ed articles used to assemble the Segal-Cover scores deal almost entirely with civil rights and 
civil liberties concerns. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 322. 
 37. Id. at 323. 
 38. Id. at 351. 
 39. See Lee Epstein et al., Ideological Drift Among Supreme Court Justices: Who, When, 
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While the Attitudinal Model has been a dominant approach to 
assessing judicial behavior in recent decades, and methods of 
measuring judicial attitudes continue to improve, not all scholars of 
judicial behavior are wholly enamored with the approach. At a basic 
level, most critics of the Model simply argue that it fails to 
reasonably consider the possibility of alternative constraints and joint 
influence, arguing that Justices simply cannot always freely impose 
their policy preferences. As Gregory Caldeira comments, “Justices, 
like other political actors, are not free to translate their preferences 
directly into policy in any and all situations. Instead, the [J]ustices 
maximize their policy preference under the constraints of law, policy, 
and custom.”40 Critics also suggest that Attitudinal theorists do not 
fairly assess legal considerations, arguing that tests of the legal model 
are unduly narrow and simplistic.41  
Finally, some question whether purely Attitudinal accounts of 
judicial decision-making adequately account for external and internal 
dynamics that might lead Justices to vote in strategic ways that are 
not always consistent with their sincere ideological preferences.42 
Notwithstanding the plentiful critiques of the Attitudinal Model, it 
has become a cornerstone of judicial behavior scholarship, and it 
likely constitutes the foremost rejoinder to classical legal accounts of 
Court decision-making. As Howard Gillman points out, it is 
“considered the common sense of the discipline that Supreme Court 
[J]ustices should be viewed as promoters of their personal policy 
 
and How Important?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1483 (2007) (discussing implications of Justices’ 
ideological drift for presidential appointment); Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, 
Assessing Preference Change on the U.S. Supreme Court, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 365 (2007) 
(comparing the scores with time-invariant approaches); Andrew D. Martin & Kevin M. Quinn, 
Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 
1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002) (introducing and explaining the approach and 
scores); Andrew D. Martin et al., The Median Justice on the United States Supreme Court, 83 
N.C. L. REV. 1275 (2005) (using the scores to discern the ideological center of the Court). 
 40. Gregory A. Caldeira, Review: The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model, 88 AM. 
POL. SCI. REV. 485, 485 (1994). 
 41. See Melinda Gann Hall, Review: The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal Model, 57 J. 
POL. 254 (1995). 
 42. See LAWRENCE BAUM, THE PUZZLE OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 89–124 (1997) 
(discussing strategic judicial behavior); EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 26, at 1–18 (discussing 
strategic judicial behavior). 
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preferences rather than as interpreters of law.”43 Although critics may 
argue over the dominance of personal policy preference, few argue 
over its importance. While Hammond, Bonneau and Sheehan criticize 
the Attitudinal Model, they nonetheless recognize that “[t]he 
Attitudinal Model has become the most widely recognized and 
influential representation of decision-making on the Supreme Court, 
and little can be published without citing at least some of the 
arguments by Spaeth and associates.”44 This being said, we argue 
below that Selection Theory considerations may have important 
implications for how we view and utilize the Attitudinal Model in 
explaining legal decision-making in the future. 
B. Selection Hypothesis 
Selection Theory has enjoyed a long history in the law and 
economics literature.45 For the most part, the law and economics field 
has overlooked the judicial politics dynamics that can affect case 
outcomes, focusing instead on the influence of case selection by 
litigants.46 The basic premise is that litigants estimate probable 
outcomes of their cases before deciding to bring them to trial or 
appeal. In disputes with clearly predictable outcomes, the parties 
typically settle since doing so is generally more efficient. It is those 
cases in which outcomes are not readily discernable for one side or 
the other that make it to the courts or appeal. This theory is central to 
the seminal “Selection Hypothesis” article of Priest and Klein, who 
reason that courts do not hear a random sample of cases and that this 
fact has important implications for the inferences that we draw from 
studying formally adjudicated disputes.47  
 
 43. Howard Gillman, Review: What’s Law Got to Do with It? Judicial Behavioralists Test 
the “Legal Model” of Judicial Decision Making, 26 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 465, 466 (2001). 
 44. THOMAS H. HAMMOND, CHRISTOPHER W. BONNEAU & REGINALD S. SHEEHAN, 
STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR AND POLICY CHOICE ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 39 (2005). In a 
similar vein, Lawrence Baum concludes, “The [A]ttitudinal [M]odel in its various versions has 
been the most influential conception of judicial behavior in political science.” BAUM, supra 
note 42, at 25. 
 45. See Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes 
and Their Resolution, 27 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1067 (1989), for a good review of the history of 
this literature. 
 46. de Figueiredo, supra note 12, at 502. 
 47. See Priest & Klein, supra note 5. 
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More specifically, the argument dictates “that plaintiff win rates at 
trial approach 50 percent as the fraction of cases going to trial 
approaches zero.”48 In other words, as parties are able to 
prognosticate outcomes more accurately and settle disputes more 
often, those cases that do make it to adjudication have win rates that 
fall about evenly for the parties. Those cases that see their day in 
court are cases that do not have qualities that facilitate readily 
discernable outcomes. For instance, some cases or issues do not lend 
themselves to a clear ideological set of potential outcomes. Other 
cases may involve a novel question of law or complex combinations 
of facts and legal issues, so juror or judicial reaction to such a 
situation may be difficult to predict. Priest and Klein tested this 
theory in a number of courts and found that “plaintiff victories will 
tend toward 50 percent whether the legal standard is negligence or 
strict liability, whether judges or juries are hostile or sympathetic.”49 
This basic proposition was confirmed in their analysis of trial court 
cases decided by both juries and judges.50 
The Selection Hypothesis theory has enjoyed wide application in 
the law and economics field; indeed it has been noted that “[f]ew 
results in the law and economics of litigation have sparked as much 
interest as [Priest and Klein’s] hypothesis.”51 Priest and Klein were 
understandably concerned with how well appellate cases epitomized 
the entirety of litigation and legal disputes. That is, those cases that 
actually make it to the courtroom are a minute sample of original 
cases, and appellate cases are an even smaller fraction of that 
number. As they note, “[m]ost legal scholars . . . either ignore the 
problem of the representativeness of appellate decisions or presume 
representativeness.”52 In an effort to correct for this oversight, Priest 
 
 48. Daniel Kessler, Thomas Meites & Geoffrey Miller, Explaining Deviations from the 
Fifty-Percent Rule: A Multimodal Approach to the Selection of Cases for Litigation, 25 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 233, 233 (1996). 
 49. Priest & Klein, supra note 5, at 5. 
 50. They find evidence to support the 50% rule in a number of judicial venues, including a 
number of jury decisions in Cook County, Illinois, and local, state, and federal courts. They find 
further evidence to support their theory in judges’ decisions made in a variety of U.S. district 
courts and in decisions rendered by justices of the peace in Hamilton County, Ohio. Id. at 30–
54. 
 51. Kessler et al., supra note 48, at 233. 
 52. Priest & Klein, supra note 5, at 3. 
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and Klein worked to develop a model that clarifies the relationship 
between disputes settled and disputes litigated. Their model is one of 
pure economics; in other words, one that is determined by litigants’ 
perceived utility of litigation and settlement, including “the expected 
costs to parties of favorable or adverse decisions, the information that 
parties possess about the likelihood of success at trial, and the direct 
costs of litigation and settlement.”53 Assuming that litigants develop 
rational estimates of judicial decisions, their model predicts that those 
cases chosen for litigation will be neither random nor representative.  
Strategic litigants will carefully weigh their potential case 
outcomes, based on a number of relevant factors, with the ideology of 
the relevant adjudicators likely being a fundamental consideration, 
and make strategic case-sorting decisions accordingly. Hence, 
ideology does not directly influence judicial decision-making, 
according to Selection Theory proponents, because its impact has 
already been accounted for by the litigants in their decision to take 
the case to court or to appeal. While the effect of strategic case 
sorting on the influence of ideology in judicial decision-making may 
not have been the primary focus of Priest and Klein’s study—they 
were more broadly interested in selection phenomena and litigation 
outcomes—it was integral to their Selection Hypothesis theory. With 
ideology accounted for on the front end, it should not affect those 
cases that actually make it to the courtroom. Similarly, litigants also 
consider other trends and norms of courts. If parties can ascertain 
adherence to other norms (such as those preferred by the legalistic, 
strategic, or other theories of judicial decision-making), then they can 
take such factors into account in the decision to settle or try a case. 
Therefore, any potential influences of these factors should be 
nullified.  
Notwithstanding the intuitive appeal of Priest and Klein‘s 
premise, ample criticism of their theory, specifically their “50% rule” 
proposition, soon followed publication of their study.54 Early 
empirical applications were not generally supportive, as any 
variations from a strict 50% win rate were considered to be strong 
 
 53. Id. at 4. 
 54. See, e.g., Donald Wittman, Is the Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?, 14 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 185 (1985). 
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evidence against Priest and Klein’s theory.55 Critics also charged that 
there were important theoretical reasons to believe that the strategic 
dispute-sorting process proposed by Priest and Klein might be 
inaccurate; for instance, the parties might possess asymmetric 
information on case outcome probabilities or parties might have 
differential stakes, or possibly even different goals, in the dispute.56 
Although win rates for any subset of litigants almost always vary 
from 50%, Joel Waldfogel notes that “because [it] predicts 50 percent 
only as a limiting implication, plaintiff win rates deviating from 50 
percent do not by themselves provide evidence against [Priest and 
Klein’s] theory.”57 More recent studies, using more sophisticated 
analyses that incorporate some of the aforementioned theoretical 
considerations, have tended to confirm the viability of the 50% rule. 
Indeed, in his 1998 study Waldfogel finds that  
[t]he process of actual pretrial adjudication and settlement . . . 
appears to eliminate both high- and low-quality cases from the 
pool proceeding to trial. Consequently, the selection of cases 
for trial results in plaintiff win rates at trial approaching 50 
percent. . . . [C]ases both above and below the decision 
standard are settled or adjudicated out of the filed pool, leading 
to a tendency toward central, not extreme, plaintiff win rates at 
trial.58 
Other theoretically sophisticated studies have similarly supported 
the Selection Hypothesis. Peter Siegelman and John Donohue 
investigate the outcomes of employment discrimination cases to test 
the validity of the Priest-Klein theory.59 They find that “[h]igher 
unemployment rates induce a significant rise in the number of cases, 
but these incremental cases are substantially weaker than the average 
 
 55. See generally Kessler et al., supra note 48 (reviewing cases finding deviation from 
strict 50% rule). 
 56. See Cross, supra note 4, at 1491–93 (discussing theoretical critiques of the 50% rule). 
 57. Joel Waldfogel, Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations 
Theories of Litigation, 41 J.L. & ECON. 451, 453 (1998). 
 58. Id. at 474–75. 
 59. Peter Siegelman & John J. Donohue III, The Selection of Employment Discrimination 
Disputes for Litigation: Using Business Cycle Effects to Test the Priest-Klein Hypothesis, 24 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 427 (1995).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  Explaining U.S. Supreme Court Decision-Making 279 
 
 
cases filed when unemployment rates are lower.”60 Their model 
confirms the predictions of the Priest-Klein theory, that weaker cases 
would be weeded out and settled. This, in turn, leads to less 
predictable cases going to trial, and a 50% win rate for the plaintiff in 
their study. In a similar vein, Kessler, Meites and Miller’s empirical 
application of the 50% rule is also supportive.61 Using data from 
more than 3,000 cases arising in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
between 1982 and 1987, they use a multimodal approach to 
understanding the selection of cases for litigation. Simply put, their 
approach focuses on how assumptions implicit in the Selection 
Hypothesis model (e.g., symmetrical information) might be violated 
and how these conditions may cause win rates to vary from 50%. 
They account for the existence of such conditions, and after 
controlling for multimodal case characteristics, find evidence 
confirming a tendency toward 50% win rates.62  
Much like the Attitudinal Model, the Selection Hypothesis will no 
doubt continue to have both champions and critics. However, its 
influence on the literature is undeniable, and it has become a staple of 
law and economics teaching and textbooks.63 In the next section we 
endeavor to explain how this theory can be effectively melded with 
political science-based Attitudinal approaches to help provide a more 
nuanced explanation of U.S. Supreme Court decision-making. 
III. THE INTERSECTION OF JUDICIAL ATTITUDES AND LITIGANT 
SELECTION THEORY 
Political science approaches to explaining legal outcomes have 
not given much attention to the Selection Hypothesis or the general 
notion that strategic pre-adjudication decisions may affect judicial 
decision-making at the outcome stage. Yet failure to consider such 
selection effects may have implications for our findings and how we 
 
 60. Id. at 451. 
 61. Kessler et al., supra note 48, at 248–56.  
 62. Extensive reviews of literature relevant to Priest and Klein’s theory can be found in 
Kessler, id., and more recently in Cross, supra note 4.  
 63. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 375–77 (2d ed. 
1997); A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 107–18 (1989); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 604–39 (4th ed. 1992). 
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understand judicial decision-making. As Friedman cautions, 
“[p]ositive scholars need to demonstrate an awareness of whether a 
settlement effect might be biasing their conclusions.”64 The 
aforementioned disciplinary theoretical gap notwithstanding, a 
handful of studies in political science have endeavored to venture into 
the intersection of litigant selection and judicial ideology. In 1995, 
Donald Songer and his associates demonstrated that criminal 
defendants were strategic in their decisions to appeal their circuit 
court of appeals losses in search–and-seizure cases to the U.S. 
Supreme Court.65 They found that the likelihood that a criminal 
defendant would appeal his or her loss to the Court was influenced by 
a number of factors, including the probability that he or she would 
prevail on the merits, which, in turn, was partly a function of the 
ideology of the Justices.66 While they did not examine the effect of 
litigant selection on judicial behavior or the influence of attitudes on 
Supreme Court outcomes, their research did provide us with some 
important initial evidence that litigants are strategic in sorting cases 
for potential adjudication in the U.S. Supreme Court.  
Two more recent studies on litigation in the U.S. courts of appeals 
have also explored the intersection of Selection Theory and the 
Attitudinal Model. Frank Cross’s 2003 study on the courts of appeals 
provides an excellent summary of leading theories of judicial 
decision-making, including legal theory, political (Attitudinal) 
theory, strategic theory, and litigant-driven (Selection) theory.67 In 
addition to providing surveys of each theory’s relevant literature and 
judges’ self-assessment of these theories, he also tests each theory 
using courts of appeals data.68 He finds that legal and political factors 
(attitudes) are the most important determinants of courts of appeals 
decision-making and that strategic and litigant-driven factors have 
little-to-no influence.69 He tests the litigant-driven model by 
considering the differential success of presumably more sophisticated 
 
 64. Friedman, supra note 11, at 271. 
 65. Donald R. Songer, Charles M. Cameron & Jeffrey A. Segal, An Empirical Test of the 
Rational-Actor Theory of Litigation, 57 J. POL. 1119, 1127 (1995). 
 66. Id. at 1126. 
 67. Cross, supra note 4. 
 68. Id. at 1497–1514. 
 69. Id. at 1514 
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and strategic “repeat players,” namely the federal government.70 He 
finds that when controls from the other theories are introduced, the 
presence of the federal government as a party is inconsequential to 
judicial outcomes.71  
In 2005, John M. de Figueiredo set forth a more direct test of the 
intersection of Selection Theory and the Attitudinal Model. He 
recognized that a vast literature attributes legal decisions to judicial 
ideology and sought to reconcile this general understanding with 
what has been posited by Selection Theory scholars.72 He reasoned 
that, “while law and economics models (which do consider selection) 
do not generally consider judge ideology at the time of case 
outcomes, judicial politics models (which do consider judge 
ideology) generally do not consider case selection.”73 To assess these 
considerations jointly, he examines telecommunications regulatory 
cases in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. He focuses on the effect 
of judicial ideology in two regards: the selection of cases by litigants 
for appeal and the outcomes of the cases.74 Specifically, he analyzes 
the decisions of firms to challenge Federal Communications 
Commission (“FCC”) regulations and the decisions of the D.C. 
 
 70. Id. at 1512–14. 
 71. Id. While this effort to test Selection Theory is commendable, it is not evident that 
these findings entirely discredit the Selection Hypothesis, as the study may have some 
limitations. The first limitation of Cross’s study is that it is a rather attenuated test of Priest and 
Klein’s theory, which suggests that outcomes for any set of litigants (including the federal 
government) should be about fifty–fifty, due to strategic litigant sorting (i.e., decisions to appeal 
or not). Admittedly, the federal government’s involvement probably provides an example of a 
situation in which the strict 50% assumption should perhaps be relaxed—the federal 
government is a repeat player and its win rates should probably deviate upward from 50%, 
possibly due to, among other reasons, superior information access and experience. However, 
Cross’s findings are also limited in scope (i.e., only criminal cases) and might benefit from 
considering alternative model specifications to ensure robustness of findings. More 
fundamentally, these findings stand in opposition to a strong literature that suggests that repeat 
players, and the federal government in particular, do in fact enjoy a higher rate of success in the 
courts of appeals than other litigants. See, e.g., Donald R. Songer et al., Do the “Haves” Come 
Out Ahead over Time? Applying Galanter’s Framework to the Decisions of the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 1925–1988, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 811 (1999); Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. 
Sheehan, Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and Underdogs in the United States Courts of 
Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 235 (1992). 
 72. de Figueiredo, supra note 12, at 501–02. 
 73. Id. at 502. 
 74. Id. at 506. 
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Circuit Court of Appeals in these cases.75 Using a two-stage 
estimation procedure to assess firms’ decisions to appeal agency 
losses and case outcomes in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, de 
Figueiredo finds evidence for the influence of judicial ideology at 
both junctures.76 Firms’ estimates of the ideology of the judges who 
would hear their appeals influence their decisions to appeal.77 In 
those cases that are appealed, the ideology of the judicial panel 
hearing the case is a significant determinant of case outcomes.78 This 
provides only partial confirmation of the Selection Hypothesis: while 
litigants do appear to reference judicial ideology in strategically 
sorting their cases for appeal, the influence of judicial ideology 
persists, at least to some degree, in case decisions.79 While both the 
Cross and de Figueirido studies are intriguing and make important 
inroads toward developing integrated accounts that incorporate 
Selection Theory, neither study entirely undercuts either major theory 
or provides a precise estimate of the specific effect of strategic case 
sorting on the influence of ideology on judicial decision-making. 
Perhaps more importantly, none of the studies outlined above 
endeavors to provide information on our central question—what 
drives decision making on the U.S. Supreme Court? 
 
 75. Id. at 503. This particular area was chosen because of the profound impact of FCC 
regulatory decisions following the dissolution of AT&T in 1984, when the FCC took over a 
number of communication domains, including “the issuance of wireless licenses; the expansion 
of satellite technology; the deregulation of long distance and local networks; the fusion of cable 
television . . . , wireless, and telephone technology; and the increasing importance of spectrum 
in radio, broadcast television, and other forms of communication.” Id. 
 76. Id. at 509–10. 
 77. Id. at 518. 
 78. Id. at 518–19. 
 79. As with Cross’s, this study has limitations. First, it is very narrow in scope, 
encompassing an extremely small fraction of the cases handled by the circuit courts of appeals. 
Interestingly, the identities of the judges hearing the cases are actually unknown to the litigants 
before the filing of the appeal, because the panel of judges is chosen from a large bloc or banc 
of possible judges from the circuit. Additionally, the defendant in these cases is always the 
federal agency, and de Figueiredo actually makes a compelling case that the FCC is not acting 
strategically in these cases; his reasons include lack of FCC motivation and heavy FCC 
caseloads. Thus, there may be no reason to believe that the effects of judicial ideology should 
be nullified in case outcomes. See id. at 520 (“If there was strategic behavior on the part of the 
FCC, we should see statistically insignificant coefficients on the ideological variables with 
values close to zero, as the ideological effects would be cleansed by the FCC’s strategic 
decision making.”).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol29/iss1/10
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2009]  Explaining U.S. Supreme Court Decision-Making 283 
 
 
A. The Selection of Cases for Appeal by Litigants 
We believe that the Attitudinal Model and the Selection 
Hypothesis can be effectively combined to offer an integrated theory 
of judicial decision-making that considers the entire judicial process. 
In this regard, Selection Theory may help define the parameters of 
the Attitudinal Model. Ultimately, our goal is the development of a 
more finely nuanced approach to judicial decision-making—a theory 
that considers the broader context in which judges make decisions. 
As previously noted, Litigant Selection Theory studies have typically 
focused on trial court, rather than Supreme Court, decision-making. 
Applying the Selection Model to the U.S. Supreme Court requires us 
to carefully consider the relevant institutional and environmental 
features that are special to the nation’s High Court. Unlike U.S. 
district courts or courts of appeals, the Supreme Court has enjoyed a 
primarily discretionary docket since the Certiorari Act.80 
Consequently, the Court does not have to hear all of the cases 
appealed to it, but rather chooses almost all of the cases it hears via 
the certiorari process. Accordingly, litigants cannot completely 
dictate the Court’s on-the-merits docket (as they largely can in trial 
and intermediate appellate courts); they have only the power to 
prescribe the pool of cases from which the justices can choose to 
grant certiorari. This power, however, is not inconsequential. By 
prescribing the case pool, litigants define not only the parameters of 
the issues the Court can address, but also the quality and character of 
the available cases raising those issues. For example, from 1997 to 
2004, the average (mean) number of criminal cases disposed of 
(terminated) by the U.S. courts of appeals was 7,532.5; 
hypothetically, almost all of these cases could have resulted in a 
petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court. During the same 
timeframe (1997–2004), the average (mean) number of petitions of 
criminal cases from the U.S. courts of appeals to the Supreme Court 
was only about 28% of that amount, or 2,110.75.81 This winnowing 
 
 80. Judiciary (Certiorari) Act of 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936 (current version codified at 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1251–1294 (2000)). 
 81. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS: ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR (VARIOUS YEARS), http://www. 
uscourts.gov/judbususc/judbus.html.  
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process clearly narrows the set of cases from which the Court can 
select for review. The winnowing that occurs in the Court’s certiorari 
selection process is even more pronounced. From 1997-2004 the 
average number of these 2,110.75 criminal petitions for certiorari 
accepted for review by the Court was 27.75, or less than 2%.82 
There is good reason to believe that litigants are strategic in their 
decisions to appeal to the Supreme Court.83 A party losing at the 
lower level incurs significant costs in appealing cases to the Supreme 
Court, both in appealing for certiorari and, if successful, the 
additional substantive appeal on the merits.84 Parties who win at the 
lower level may also wish to avoid the costs of appeal, as well as risk 
costs, by settling their cases, especially if they perceive that the Court 
might overturn their lower court victory. While parties typically do 
not settle their cases between a grant of certiorari and the merits 
appeal, such settlements are allowed under Supreme Court Rule 46, 
and the Court usually sees a small number of such settlements every 
Term.85 Thus, strategic settlement and case sorting may occur even 
after the grant of certiorari. 
Litigants’ strategic sorting produces a pool of cases for possible 
Court review that are not randomly distributed. Rather, this process 
produces a selection of cases that are generally not amenable to 
settlement, likely because they do not provide conspicuous outcome 
cues, or because the litigants are otherwise constrained from 
resolving their disputes through negotiated agreement. Litigants are 
 
 82. Id. The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts breaks down such information by 
civil and criminal cases. The patterns set forth above are similar to those found in the civil 
context. Of course, the U.S. courts of appeals are not the only source of petitions for certiorari 
to the Court. However, it is likely that appeals to the Supreme Court from other courts (e.g., 
state supreme courts) would follow a similar winnowing pattern. 
 83. See, e.g., Songer et al., supra note 65, at 829–30 (providing evidence of litigants’ 
strategic behavior in appeals to the Supreme Court). 
 84. For instance, Gregory Caldeira and John Wright obtained estimates of the external 
financial costs of filing an amicus brief in 1988. They found that prices of a single brief from a 
reputable law firm consistently fell in the range of fifteen thousand to twenty thousand dollars, 
although one respondent reported paying as much as sixty thousand dollars. See Gregory A. 
Caldeira & John R. Wright, Organized Interests and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 
82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1109, 1112 (1988). We assume that these prices have increased since 
that time. 
 85. See EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 841–42 (9th ed. 2007), 
for information on supreme Court Rule 46 and its application. 
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also apt to make some “errors” in their selection of which disputes to 
appeal to the Court. We use the term “errors” to denote decisions by 
litigants to appeal (or not to appeal) that do not comport with rational 
estimates of their ability to win the appeals on the merits. This may 
equate with inaccurate estimations of the strength of their cases 
(relative to their opponents’ cases), which would be closer to 
traditional notions of an erroneous decision. Alternatively, it might 
emanate from an informed and rational deliberative process that 
culminates in a decision that simply does not seek to gain an 
appellate victory on the merits. We might imagine a number of 
factors that could lead litigants to fail to settle cases that may, in fact, 
be reasonably appropriate for negotiated resolution.  
First, as noted above, a litigant simply may misperceive the 
relative strength of a case due to information asymmetry between 
litigants, or, alternatively, the case at issue may simply not lend itself 
well to outcome prediction for either party, due to factual complexity 
or legal ambiguity (e.g., a case of first impression). Second, litigants 
may engage in non-merit-based strategies in which they primarily 
seek to highlight or promote their causes through Supreme Court 
review and its attendant publicity, with winning being perhaps only 
an auxiliary potential benefit. Similarly, litigants pursuing a historical 
cause or social movement may stubbornly and irrationally refuse to 
settle cases where loss is imminent, focusing instead on how history 
(or their relevant peer groups) will ultimately judge their valiant, yet 
futile, struggle. Finally, while litigants may perceive the grounds on 
which their cases might be adjudicated, their cases may ultimately 
transform or “morph” upon review by the Court. For instance, 
although litigants help frame the relevant legal issues for the Court by 
stating them in their appellate briefs, it is not uncommon that the 
ultimate set of legal issues that lead to a case’s disposition are created 
(or the originally claimed issues suppressed) by the Court during 
deliberations and opinion formation.86 Thus, while litigants’ strategic 
sorting of disputes may work to undercut the influence of judicial 
ideology in adjudicated cases (as suggested by the 50% rule), 
 
 86. See generally Kevin T. McGuire & Barbara Palmer, Issue Fluidity on the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 89 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 691 (1995) (finding that legal issue transformation 
occurs in about one-half of the Court’s cases).  
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litigants do not always sort their cases accurately or effectively, and 
this may lead to a number of cases being appealed to the Court that 
do, in fact, reasonably avail themselves to ideological decision-
making by the Court. 
B. The Selection of Appeals for Review by the Court 
The pool of cases available for potential review by the Court is 
determined by litigants. This collection of appealed cases consists 
essentially of those that remain after a strategic sorting process, 
which is driven by litigants’ perceptions of potential Court outcomes, 
plus a number of additional appealed cases in which sorting strategy 
errors have been made. While litigants shape the pool of cases 
appealed to the Court, the Justices get to decide which of these 
appealed disputes are worthy of their time and attention for review on 
the merits. It is likely that the default position of the Justices would 
be to select cases that would readily map onto their policy 
preferences. If it is to remain a viable policy-making institution, the 
Court cannot systematically avoid the highly salient legal policy 
issues of the day, which often fall upon a left-right ideological 
continuum. It stands to reason that Justices interested in preserving 
the Court’s status as a relevant policy-making entity are normally 
inclined to select for review cases that do lend themselves to 
ideological voting. 
Nevertheless, there are countervailing reasons to believe that this 
presumed default process may not always prevail. At first blush it 
would seem that a Court interested in advancing its sincere policy 
preferences (an Attitudinal Court) would simply “cherry pick” those 
cases that do readily lend themselves to ideological decision-making 
in a straightforward fashion—likely those cases in which strategic 
litigant sorting has failed (error cases). Under this scenario, litigants’ 
strategic sorting of cases for appeal would essentially have little 
effect on ideological decision-making because, out of the thousands 
of cases appealed to the High Court annually, the Justices could 
easily find one hundred or so cases, a typical docket load, that would 
effectively facilitate Attitudinal decision-making (i.e., cases falling 
upon a readily discernible left-right ideological dimension). 
However, this scenario does not accurately or fully depict the reality 
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of Supreme Court certiorari outcomes. While this scenario could be 
accurate if the Court’s certiorari decisions were made in a unilateral 
manner (e.g., if the Chief Justice single-handedly chose cases for 
review), the Court’s selection of cases for merits review is actually a 
collective decision-making process of the individual Justices.  
The Court’s case-selection process begins with the review of 
petitions for certiorari by the Justices’ clerks. The clerks make 
recommendations on certiorari for their respective Justices and the 
Justices can accept or reject the recommendations or ask for further 
case information.87 The Chief Justice assembles an initial list of cases 
for discussion at periodic certiorari review conferences (the “Discuss 
List”), and the Associate Justices can then add cases to the list that 
they wish to have considered for certiorari discussion.88 All cases not 
added to the Discuss List are in effect denied certiorari by default and 
constitute the “Dead List.”89 Indeed, this is the primary process 
whereby members of the Court sort out most petitions for certiorari 
from consideration on the merits. Of the thousands of cases appealed 
to the Court annually, the Justices place only about 20 to 30% on the 
Discuss List.90 In defending this selection process against criticism 
that Court members actually deliberate over a relatively small 
number of certiorari petitions at conference, Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist explained: 
For the sixty years since the enactment of the Certiorari Act of 
1925, there have been significant ideological divisions on the 
Court, such that one group of [J]ustices might be inclined to 
review one kind of case, and another group inclined to review 
another kind of case. When one realizes that any of nine 
[J]ustices, differing among themselves as they usually do about 
which cases are important and how cases should be decided, 
may ask that a petition for certiorari be discussed, the fate of a 
case that is “dead listed” (“dead listing” a case is the converse 
 
 87. See generally H.W. PERRY, DECIDING TO DECIDE (1991) (describing the general 
process of certiorari granting). 
 88. Id. at 85–89. 
 89. Id. at 85. 
 90. See Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, The Discuss List: Agenda Building in the 
Supreme Court, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807, 808 (1990). 
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of putting a case on the “discuss list”) is a fate well deserved. It 
simply means that none of the nine [J]ustices thought the case 
was worth discussing at conference with a view to trying to 
persuade four members of the Court to grant certiorari.91  
Thus, significant case sorting is performed by the Justices 
individually, well before they ever meet to discuss certiorari 
decisions. Furthermore, Ryan Schoen and Paul Wahlbeck’s 2006 
study provides strong evidence that Justices place petitions for 
certiorari on the Discuss List with a strategic eye toward how they 
will be decided on the merits.92 Thus, it is evident that consequential 
strategic sorting is at play in the development of the Court’s merits 
docket before the Justices even meet to deliberate on petitions for 
certiorari. At the periodic certiorari conference meetings, Justices 
must find at least three of their colleagues to agree that the case is 
worth hearing to satisfy the well-known Rule of Four requirement for 
review on the merits. A river of literature has addressed the prospect 
that Justices act strategically in their conference votes to grant or 
deny petitions for certiorari in conference. Strategic Justices might 
vote to grant a petition for certiorari where they want to address a 
lower court’s decision and believe that enough other Justices would 
agree with them to prevail on the merits. Alternatively, strategic 
Justices might vote to deny certiorari where they have concerns that 
their preferences would not be supported by a majority of the Court 
on the merits. Most studies agree that Justices engage in strategic 
certiorari voting to a certain degree to help effectuate their policy 
preferences on the merits, but there is disagreement as to the extent of 
such strategic behavior by Justices and as to whether it is ultimately 
effective for advancing their policy preferences.93  
Thus, in considering this process we might conceive of the 
Justices as acting not unlike individual litigants who are strategically 
 
 91. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 235 (2d ed. 2001). 
 92. Ryan Schoen & Paul J. Wahlbeck, Paper Presented at the Southern Political Science 
Association Annual Meeting: The Discuss List and Agenda-Setting on the Supreme Court (Jan. 
6, 2006). 
 93. See generally Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as 
Strategic Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 
J. POL. 824 (1995) (reviewing literature on strategic certiorari voting by Justices). 
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sorting cases for settlement or trial. Each Justice has his or her own 
policy agenda, and each seeks to effectuate these policy preferences 
through the strategic selection of cases for merit resolution. In short, 
Justices choose cases for review (both in framing the Discuss List 
and in certiorari conference voting) with an eye toward their ultimate 
“winnability” on the merits (i.e., whether the case’s outcome will 
comport with their ideological preferences). Of course, none of the 
Justices can individually settle cases or control whether cases 
ultimately make it to the Court’s docket; their decisions are 
necessarily collective in nature. Consequently, the process at play in 
Supreme Court case selection is certainly not strictly analogous to the 
litigant trial selection process posited by Priest and Klein. Still, the 
Justices’ strategic selection of cases, at both the Discuss List and 
certiorari conference vote stages, suggests that there may be another 
layer of strategic case sorting (in addition to the prior tactical sorting 
by litigants) that further promotes a Court docket that is not randomly 
distributed.  
Both litigants and Justices are apt to sort cases onto the Court’s 
docket based in large part on the perceived winnability of cases, 
which should lead to case outcomes that gravitate toward 50% win 
rates. If potential Supreme Court litigants consider Court ideology in 
gauging case winnability, and Justices similarly contemplate the 
relative ideology of their brethren in making case selection decisions, 
then we might reasonably expect that this double case-sorting process 
should yield Court outcomes that hover around 50% liberal and 50% 
conservative. However, there is also reason to believe that strategic 
case sorting is hardly perfect, and that there are important factors and 
considerations that may undercut strategic case sorting and thus cause 
deviation from 50% outcomes. We previously outlined reasons why 
litigants might err in their strategic case-sorting process, potentially 
causing outcomes to deviate from 50%. Justices may also err in their 
strategic case-sorting process for analogous, yet contextually distinct, 
reasons. 
A Justice may make decisions that help place a case on the 
Court’s docket even though these actions go against what we might 
reasonably assume would be the Justice’s rational choices in 
promoting their policy preferences. But why would this occur? First, 
while the Court’s docket is almost entirely discretionary, cases may 
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arise in which the Justices are effectively constrained in their 
selection decisions. Segal and Spaeth explain: 
For all practical purposes, the [J]ustices are free to accept or 
reject cases brought to their attention as they see fit. That is to 
say, the Court has full control over its docket. But that is not to 
say that the Court has no obligation to decide certain sorts of 
cases. The [J]ustices would not likely refuse to review a 
decision by a lower federal court that voided a major act of 
Congress, nor would it decline to consider a state court’s 
decision that substantially redefined the scope of the First 
Amendment, absent extenuating circumstances.94 
In such situations, strategic sorting is essentially foiled (at least at the 
certiorari granting level) and these cases may very well lend 
themselves to Justices’ ideological voting.  
But this is not the only reason why Justices take on cases that do 
not necessarily promote their ideological agenda. The reasons are 
almost as plentiful as the reasons litigants fail to strategically sort out 
cases through settlement. Perhaps foremost of these reasons is the 
fact that Justices simply sometimes err in predicting how other 
Justices will vote and how cases will ultimately be resolved. Another 
reason is that cases, and the grounds on which they are decided, may 
change or morph after certiorari is granted. As noted previously, this 
morphing may come about due to the evolution of the dispositive 
issues along the continuum of the Court’s decision-making process, 
including compromises reached during the opinion-writing and 
redrafting phases.95 Finally, Justices sometimes have differential 
salience points for given issues and cases. Hence, while some Justices 
may have very strong ideological preferences in a case and favor 
certiorari to promote those preferences, other Justices may disagree 
on the policy merits, even if they do not have very strong preferences 
in the case or interest in the issue at hand. This situation may lead 
Justices without strong preferences to accommodate Justices with 
stronger preferences in the case selection process by joining them 
toward gaining the critical four votes. But even if they are not 
 
 94. SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 1, at 240–41. 
 95. See generally McGuire & Palmer, supra note 86.  
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especially interested in or have strong convictions on a case or issue, 
why would they do this? It may be that Justices engage in such 
accommodating behavior in cases on which they are otherwise 
indifferent in hopes that this collegial behavior will be reciprocated in 
the future in cases in which they have greater personal stakes. 
Alternatively, they may wish to be seen by their colleagues as being 
cooperative “team players.”96 Thus, there are a number of reasons 
why any strategic case sorting by Justices (and litigants) may not 
always be pervasive or effective, and, accordingly, cases that lend 
themselves well to Attitudinal voting may find their way onto the 
Court’s docket.  
In Priest and Klein’s pure Selection Hypothesis scenario all cases 
that have predictable outcomes are selected out of adjudication 
through settlement, and so litigation outcomes are a 50-50 
proposition. However, in reality both litigants and Justices make 
mistakes in case outcome predictions and even engage in purposive 
behavior that is not merits- or outcome-motivated. This leads to 
departures from the strict Selection Hypothesis and, accordingly, 
deviations from 50% win rates for any subset of litigants (e.g., liberal 
or conservative outcome-seeking parties). The Attitudinal Model 
suggests that Supreme Court Justices make decisions based upon 
their sincere ideological preferences, and the ideological preferences 
of the Justices of the Supreme Court are likely better known than 
those of any other judicial actors in the nation.  
So, we are faced with a conundrum: if Justices base their 
decisions on their ideological preferences, and their preferences are 
known, then litigants (and perhaps Justices) should nullify the effect 
of such preferences through strategic case selection. We believe that 
this is in fact what does happen, but not in all instances. As discussed 
above, the case-sorting process of litigants and Justices is fraught 
with error and non-outcome motivated behavior. Consequently, 
strategic case sorting likely does obviate attitudinal decision-making, 
but only where it is pervasive and effective. Where we find evidence 
of effective and pervasive strategic case sorting (by litigants and/or 
 
 96. See generally LAWRENCE BAUM, JUDGES AND THEIR AUDIENCES: A PERSPECTIVE ON 
JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 50–60 (2006); HAMMOND ET AL., supra note 44 (presenting models for 
understanding Supreme Court decision-making at the certiorari-granting stage).  
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Justices), we might expect to find the influence of Justices’ attitudes 
on Court outcomes to be less strong or even absent. Where strategic 
case sorting is not as effective or pervasive, Justices’ attitudes should 
have a stronger influence on Court outcomes.  
IV. TESTING AN INTEGRATED MODEL OF JUDICIAL ATTITUDES AND 
SELECTION THEORY 
Our approach to assessing the relative influence of judicial 
attitudes and case selection on Supreme Court decision-making is 
straightforward. Our research environment is the Supreme Court’s 
criminal procedure cases from the 1953 Term to the 2004 Term, 
encompassing the Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts.97 Criminal 
procedure cases are typically considered high-profile decisions and 
constitute a frequently addressed topic area on the Court’s docket, 
relative to other issues, averaging over twenty-five cases per Court 
Term. They also fit within the broader set of legal concerns that are 
generally considered in the realm of “civil liberties” and, hence, are 
especially appropriate for Attitudinal Model explanation. We employ 
as our dependent variable the Court’s proportion of liberal decisions 
on these cases per Term.98 This time series of the Court’s relative 
liberalism in criminal procedure decisions (Liberal Win Rate) 
constitutes a stationary series99 and is displayed in Figure 1.  
 
 97. We employ the U.S. Supreme Court Judicial Database compiled by Harold Spaeth for 
our analysis. Our cases analyzed are chosen from analu = 0 or 1; dec_type = 1, 6, or 7. The 
database can be found on the Judicial Research Initiative website: http://www.cas.sc.edu/poli/ 
juri/setdata.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 2009). 
 98. We employ Ordinary Least Squares estimation for our analysis of this proportion-
oriented dependent variable. Given that our proportion data do not have values approaching 
either boundary (the minimum value is .14 and the maximum is .74) this is a reasonable 
approach. See Phillip Paolino, Maximum Likelihood Estimation of Models with Beta-
Distributed Dependent Variables, 9 POL. ANALYSIS 325, 345–46 (2001). 
 99. A Dickey-Fuller test for unit root suggests that the series is stationary. The 
MacKinnon approximate p value for the test statistic (-3.42) is 0.0103. 
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FIGURE 1: LIBERAL WIN RATES IN U.S. SUPREME COURT CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE CASES 
Our set of explanatory variables is also straightforward. We 
consider separately two measures of Justices’ attitudes: those 
produced by Segal and Cover, which are drawn from pre-
confirmation op-ed stories, and those suggested by Martin and Quinn, 
which are based on Justices’ relative ideal points. With each measure, 
we use the value associated with the Court’s median Justice to denote 
the Court’s ideological orientation for a given Term. We anticipate 
that these measures will be related to Supreme Court decision 
outcomes: the Segal-Cover scores are scaled to denote Court 
liberalness and therefore should be positively related to the liberal 
proportion of the Court’s decisions, and the Martin-Quinn scores are 
scaled such that they should be negatively related to Court decision 
liberalism.  
Of course, this is but a small part of our story. We are primarily 
interested in the degree, if any, to which the effect of judicial 
ideology on Court decision outcomes is conditioned on Litigant 
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Selection phenomena. As noted above, we believe that judicial 
ideology should matter least in situations in which litigant case 
sorting is pervasive and effective and should matter most where such 
litigant case sorting is less pervasive or successful. Again, we note 
that this sorting process also encompasses case sorting by the Court’s 
Justices during the case selection stage; it is a double case-sorting 
process. Thus, our primary hypothesis is: the influence of judicial 
ideology on Court outcomes should be greater where strategic case 
sorting is less pervasive or effective.  
Recall that, under Priest and Klein’s basic hypothesis, strategic 
sorting behavior should lead to litigant win rates that approach 50%. 
Of course, we also outlined a number of factors that might work to 
undermine strategic case sorting, so that win rates might deviate from 
50%. Thus, where win rates approach 50%, case sorting should be 
effective and ideology should be largely nullified. When win rates 
deviate from 50%, ideology should matter more. Accordingly, we 
endeavor to provide an estimate of deviations from Priest and Klein’s 
50% rate.  
Recall that, in Figure 1, liberal win rates typically do deviate from 
50% in a given Term, just in different degrees. We use this 
information to provide an estimate of the pervasiveness and 
effectiveness of the case sorting of litigants and Justices in a given 
Term for criminal procedure cases. In essence, if the case sorting was 
effective, then win rates should be 50%; to the degree that they 
deviate from 50%, case sorting is less effective. We use the absolute 
deviation from 50% to provide a gauge of the extent of effective case 
sorting.100 This variable (Deviation) then interacts with our ideology 
variable (either Segal-Cover scores or Martin-Quinn scores), so that 
we can assess the conditional influence of ideology as levels of case-
sorting effectiveness (i.e., deviation from 50%) change.101 
 
 100. Thus, the variable is constructed as follows: Absolute (0.5 - Liberal Win Rate). 
 101. We recognize that some readers may have concerns with the fact that our Deviation 
variable contains a component of the dependent variable in its construction. While we 
acknowledge such concerns, we note that use of forms of, or components of, a dependent 
variable on the right-hand side of a regression equation are not necessarily inappropriate when 
theory or methodological reasons suggest their use (e.g., including a lagged dependent variable 
in a time series or time series cross-sectional model). In our research design, the Deviation 
variable presents the best method of representing the effectiveness and pervasiveness of 
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Table 1 provides the results for the basic models of judicial 
ideological influence on Court decisions as well as the results for the 
integrated (interactive) models. The “S/C Basic” and “M/Q Basic” 
columns show that these ideology measures (the Segal-Cover median 
Justice score and the Martin-Quinn median Justice score, 
respectively) are statistically significant explanations for Supreme 
Court liberalism in criminal procedure cases. The “S/C Integrated” 
and “M/Q Integrated” columns display the results for the interactive 
models that account for the conditioning effect of case sorting and 
selection. In these models we find that the interaction term (Ideology 
× Deviation) is statistically significant in each model. Further, the 
integrated models have significantly stronger explanatory ability—as 
indicated by their much higher adjusted R2 values—and have lower 
root mean squared error scores. Since some of the component terms 
of the interactions are statistically significant and some are not, it is 
important to expand upon the highly conditional nature of these 
results. Robert Freidrich’s classic work on interpreting interactions 
explains that the coefficients and standard errors for an interaction’s 
component terms denote the respective values for the component 
term at issue when the other related component term is at a specific 
value. Consequently, the coefficients and standard errors for our 
component terms are highly conditional. This situation can make the 
statistical results for interactions somewhat non-intuitive and difficult 
to interpret substantively.  
 
strategic case sorting. Further, the Deviation variable and the dependent variable (Liberal Win 
Rate) are not highly correlated (-.39 correlation). 
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TABLE 1: PRAIS-WINSTON REGRESSION RESULTS FOR COURT 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LIBERALISM 
 S/C Basic S/C Integrated M/Q Basic M/Q Integrated 
         
Variable Coefficient T Coefficient t Coefficient t Coefficient t 
         
Ideology .2103 4.16 -.0330 -.52 -.1844 -4.46 -.0226 -.34 
Deviation   -.4943 -3.55   -.2845 -1.35 
Ideology × 
Deviation 
   
1.4482 
 
4.51 
   
-.8604 
 
-2.57 
         
Constant .4279 16.99 .5048 17.92 .4908 18.37 .5171 13.23 
         
 Adj. R2 = .26 
RMSE=.0995 
N=52 
DW=1.95 
Adj. R2 = .56 
RMSE=.0757 
N=52 
DW=2.16 
Adj. R2 = .28 
RMSE=.1000 
N=52 
DW=2.04
Adj. R2 = .50 
RMSE=.0819 
N=52 
DW=1.98
 
Thomas Brambor and associates provide helpful insights for 
analyzing the conditional nature of such relationships by clarifying 
the conditional nature of the variables.102 Basically, the relationship 
between the dependent variable (Y) and the component term of 
interest (X), is conditioned by the level of the other component term 
of the interaction (Z), which is considered the modifying variable. 
Accordingly, the coefficient and standard error associated with the 
relationship between Y and X may vary, depending upon the levels of 
the modifying variable, Z.  
In Figures 2 and 3 we present these conditional relationships 
graphically. Figure 2 shows the marginal effect on Court Ideology 
(measured by Segal-Cover scores) as the modifying variable, 
Deviation, varies. The solid line denotes the marginal effects of 
Ideology as Deviation increases from 50%. The 95% confidence 
interval lines around the solid sloping line indicate the conditions in 
which Ideology has a statistically significant effect on Court 
liberalism. Figure 3 provides the same information for the Martin-
Quinn measure of ideology, but recall that the scaling of this measure 
suggests a negative relationship between it and Court liberalism. In 
both figures we see that neither measure of ideology is statistically 
significant when Deviation is at or very near zero, i.e., when case 
sorting leads to approximately 50% outcomes. Thus, when case 
sorting is especially effective and pervasive, the attitudes or ideology 
 
 102. See generally Thomas Brambor, William Roberts Clark & Matt Golder, 
Understanding Interaction Models: Improving Empirical Analyses, 14 POL. ANALYSIS 63 
(2006). 
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of the Justices is nullified. However, as case sorting becomes less 
effective (i.e., Deviation increases from 50%), ideology emerges as 
an increasingly influential explanation for Court liberalism. In fact, 
the figures indicate that variations in the Deviation variable lead to 
substantial increases in the relative influence of the ideology 
measures (i.e., a one unit increase in either the S/C or M/Q median 
justice variables) on Court decision liberalism. In sum, these figures 
suggest exactly the type of conditional relationship between judicial 
ideology and strategic case sorting that we anticipated. 
FIGURE 2: INTERACTIVE EFFECTS—SEGAL-COVER MEASURE OF 
IDEOLOGY 
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FIGURE 3: INTERACTIVE EFFECTS—MARTIN-QUINN MEASURE OF 
IDEOLOGY 
 
CONCLUSION 
In assessing judicial behavior it is imperative that we consider the 
choices that Justices make in the broader context of the litigation 
process as a whole. As Priest and Klein cautioned, the adjudicated 
cases that are typically studied are the end result of a long and 
involved process and are not necessarily representative of the set of 
underlying disputes leading to those cases. In the context of the 
Supreme Court, we outlined a double sorting process in which both 
potential litigants and the Supreme Court Justices engaged in 
strategic selection of the disputes that would ultimately be 
adjudicated by the High Court. 
But what does this mean for Attitudinal Theories of Supreme 
Court decision-making? The limited literature on the intersection of 
litigant selection and judicial ideology and our own results suggest 
that, first, litigants are strategic in their choices to appeal cases to the 
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Supreme Court. The attitudinal preferences of Supreme Court 
Justices are likely better known than any other set of judicial actors’ 
and, accordingly, parties reference this information in their decision 
whether to seek review by the Court. This means that the Justices’ 
attitudes have an important role in framing the set of disputes that 
make up their pool of appeals for certiorari consideration. Further, 
this strategic process of appeal selection (by both parties and the 
Justices) has important implications for how and when Justices’ 
ideological preferences affect Supreme Court outcomes. More 
specifically, our results indicate that, when case sorting is effective 
(i.e., on the merits outcomes approach a 50% win rate), judicial 
ideology is largely nullified. Yet case sorting is effective to varying 
degrees; when it is less effective and outcomes deviate from 50%, we 
see judicial attitudes wielding a powerful influence on legal outcomes 
in the Court. In sum, we have two primary observations regarding the 
Attitudinal Model: (1) its direct influence is conditioned on the 
effectiveness of dispute sorting; and (2) attitudes have both direct 
effects and indirect effects on legal outcomes in the Court, since 
Justices’ attitudes likely influence the set of disputes that are decided 
on the merits. 
Of course, our approach to assessing the intersection of Litigant 
Selection and the Attitudinal Model constitutes just one path, and 
certainly not the only one, for incorporating dispute selection 
phenomena in our analyses of legal decision-making. There are likely 
multiple and varied ways in which scholars can incorporate these 
important considerations in studying Supreme Court decision-
making. We believe that, regardless of the approach scholars use to 
address this issue, such selection considerations are relevant and have 
important implications for the way we think about legal decision-
making, whether at the Supreme Court level or otherwise.  
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